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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - 1954-1959
EDWARD SCHROLL*
Since publication of the last survey article,' three sessions of the
Florida Legislature as well as over one hundred and fifty judicial decisions
have resulted in significant statutory amendments as well as judicial
clarification and liberalization of the Florida Workmen's Compensation
Act.
2
The most striking legislative changes have been the adoption of provi-
sions allowing for a joint petition and release not subject to modification 3 by
the 1959 legislature and the adoption by the 1955 legislature of a Special
Disability Fund making provision for reimbursement to employers, who
hire handicapped workers, for benefits paid when new injuries are sustained
in such employment. 4 Too little experience has been had in the newly
enacted "release" provisions to predict whether these provisions will remain
as a permanent addition to the act. The desirability, advantages and abuses
inherent in allowing "common law releases" not subject to modification
in workmen's compensation cases have no parallel in other fields of law.5
In contested cases where the issue is one of employer liability or responsibility
for the "injury by accident" rather than the degree of benefits, the release
provisions allow a feasible method of disposing of claims with complete
protection to the employer or his insurance carrier against future claims
arising out of the same subject matter, while giving to the injured employee
a degree of economic relief and compensation benefits to which he might
ultimately be found to be not entitled. Whether artificial contests will
ensue on liability questions for the sole purpose of extracting the release
from the injured employee still remains to be seen. Real value in use of a
release in cases involving only degree of benefits or in permanent total cases
*Member of the Florida Bar.
1. This survey covers legislative changes for years 1955, 1957 and 1959 and
judicial decisions reported from Volume 67 of the Southern Reporter, Second Series
(Oct. 1953) to Volume Ill, Southern Reporter, Second Series (May 1959).
2. For complete analysis up to 1950, see Burton, Florida Workmen's Com-
pensation 1935 to 1950, 5 MIAN L.Q. 24 and Clenicnts, Workmen's Compensation,
8 MIAMi L.Q. 469.
3. FiA. STAT. § 440.20(10) (1959).
4. FLA. STAT. 440.15(5)(D) (1955).
5. Employee's rights already compromised by substituting Workmen's Com-
pensation Benefits for common law rights. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.11, 440.15 (1935).
Compare Rosier v. Roofing & Sheet Metal Supply Co., 41 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1949) with
Crice v. Suwanee Lumber Mfg. Co., 113 So.2d 742 (Fla App. 1959). Also see Faulk &
Coleman v. Harper, 62 So.2d 62 (Fla. 1952); Bryant v. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co.,




through therapeutic capitalization has been experienced in Florida.6 The
employer or carrier's exposure under the act becomes fixed and terminated
by the release and lump sum payment; the disabled employee, through
therapeutic capitalization, receives sufficient amounts in one payment to aid
or complete successful vocational rehabilitation and again becomes a pro-
ductive member of society.'
Prior to the enactment of the "Special Disability Fund," Florida (by
statute) was an apportionment state, i.e., the employer or carrier was only
responsible for compensation resulting from the injury occurring during his
employment alone, regardless of the existence of any pre-existing permanent
impairment or the combined effect of the pre-existing impairment with the
new permanent impairment.8 Under apportionment, the injured workman
had to bear the combined effect of his injury with the pre-existing disability,"
Through judicial interpretation, the employer or carrier was compelled to
bear the combined effects when the new injury coupled with the pre-existing
disability or conditions resulted in permanent total disability.10 The obvious
harshness of apportionment was thereby minimized and effectuation of the
true purpose of the act 1 was realized.12 The effect of the awards was to
bring non-apportionment or the "full responsibility rule" into Florida, thereby
placing the entire burden of the combined disability on the employer in
permanent total cases only.' 3 With the enactment of the Special Disability
Fund (which derives its assets from annual assessments upon compensation
insurance companies and self-insurers in the State) 14 both hardships were
alleviated, the Fund reimbursing the employer for all compensation paid in
excess of those allowed for the injury or occupational disease when considered
by itself and not in conjunction with the previous physical impair-
ment." Procedurally, the employer or carrier is required to make payment to
the injured workman for all benefits and seek semi-annual reimbursement
from the Fund for benefits paid in excess of those for which the employer
alone is responsible. Provision is made for direct payment from the Fund
to the injured employee, if for any reason the employer should fail to pay
6. joint petition and release on $65,000 lump sum for paraplegic invested
in apartment house. Coffee v. Biscayne Stevedoring Co., Inc. Claim No. U-77697 (1959).
7. LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 61.20, 82N6.
8. F.A. STAT. 440.15(5) (A)(B)(C)( 1955).
9. Lyles v. Crosse Point Mkt., I FC i20 (Fla. 1955).
10. Alexander v. Peoples Ice Co., 85 So.2d 846 (Fa. 1955).
11. Dennis v. Brown, 93 So.Zd 584 (Fa. 1957).
12. Noah v. Board of Pub. Instr. of Orange County, 1 FCR 372, cert. denied,
93 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1950).
13. Ibid. Alexander v. Peoples Ice Co., 85 So.2d 846 (Fla. 1955).
14. FiA. STAT. § 440.15(5) (D) (6) (h) (1955); FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5)(D)
(7)(b) (1959).
15. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5) (D) (3) (4) (5) (1955). Florida Indus. Comm'n
v. National Trucking Co., 107 So.2d 397 (Fla. App. 1958); City of Miami Beach v.
Florida Indus. Comm'n, 105 So.2d 885 (la. App. 1958).
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the additional benefits.' As originally enacted, the Special Disability Fund
was broad in scope, there being no limitation as to the nature of the
benefits paid to which the employer was entitled to reimibursement.17 Serious
procedural obstacles developed due to lack of a provision in the 1955
Special Disability Fund allowing the Fund legal representation in mnatters
involving reimbursement from it as well as determination of the Fund's
degree of responsibility in cases where it was involved, the judiciary
holding the Fund not to be a legal entity and not entitled to legal
representation."' Drastic legislative changes were enacted in 1959 remov-
ing the procedural obstacles"' as well as deleting and bringing about
a general destruction of the broad scope of the Fund's responsibility to
employers and their injured workmen. 0 The 1959 amendments limited the
obligation of the Fund's reimbursement to compensation paid for permanent
disability only, the limiting word "permanent" being added, and the broad
term "all compensation and other benefits" being deleted.2' The legislative
intent of encouraging the employment of the physically handicapped was
announced22 while the hardships placed on the injured workman by the
apportionment provisions of the act remain unchanged3 Despite the
announcement of the legislative intent that the Special Disability Fund
shall not be construed to provide or create new benefits to the injured
workman, 24 the language of the amendments limits the disabled workman
to apportionment, i.e. compensation for the latter injury when considered
by itself, 25 unless his employer was aware of the pre-existing permanent
physical impairment which was likely to be a hindrance or obstacle to
employment prior to the occurrence of the subsequent injury or occupa-
tional disease.26 If such knowledge exists, the employee can then collect
for the combined effects of both permanencies; without such knowledge,
the employee is relegated to apportionment.
27
Other legislative changes have re-vested review of full commission
orders entered after July 1st, 1959, with the Florida Supreme Court 8 and
16. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5)(1))(5) (1955). Direct payment from fund deleted.
FLA. STAT. 440.15(5)(1))(6) (1959).
17. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5)(D); also see Shivers Super Store v. Florida Indust.
Comm'n, 102 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1958).
18. Florida Indust. Coinn'n v. National Truckitg Co., 107 So.2d 397 (a.
App. 1958).
19. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5)(D)(8) (1959),
20. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(51(D) (1959),.
21, FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5) (I)) (1959); FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5) (D ) (3) () (5)
(1955). Also compare death Ieicfits HLA. STAr. § 440.15(5) (I)) (5) (195) wit F.a.
STAT. § 440.15(5) (9) (3) (955).
22, FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5)(D)(5) (1959).
23. FLA. STAT. C 4.55 15)
24. FLA, STAT. § 440.15:5() (5 ) (1959).
25. FLA. STAT. § 440.15 5)(D)(5) (1959).
26. FLA. STAT. § 440.15 5)(D)(4) (1959).
27. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5 (C)(D); See also Footnotes 10, 12.
28. FLA. STAT. § 440.27 (1959).
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allowed applications for review by, the full commission of deputy com-
missioners' orders to be filed with the deputy commissioner with an
additional ten days being allowed thereafter for the filing with the deputy
commissioner of cross-applications for review.29
The vexing problem of injured workmen going without benefits while
two or more employers or carriers squabble amongst themselves as to
who is responsible for the payment of benefits 0 was also met, partially
with 1957 changes, by granting the commission the authority to adjudicate
the controversy 3' and, completely in 1959, by allowing voluntary payment
to be made without prejudice to a subsequent determination of the
controversy for reimbursement.
3 2
As a result of the opinion of the District Court of Appeals, First
District, in Russell v. Bass,33 it became necessary to amend the act and
re-define the word "commission" to include deputy commissioners34 and
to specifically vest deputy commissioners with the authority to grant lump
sum payments,351 a function deputy commissioners had exercised long
before Russell v. Bass. The definition of "employee" was broadened in
1955 to include corporate officers, ' and the restriction against farm
laborers coming under the act was minimized in 1957.31
The authority of the commission to invoke the use of vocational
rehabilitation prior to adjudication of permanent disability 8 was con-
tested and denied in Stewart v. Board of Public Instruction, Dade
County,"9 requiring legislative changes in 1959, which granted the com-
mission the authority to use this most important adjunct of rehabilitation
prior to the determination of permanent disability.40 In permanent disabili-
ties adjudged to be total, rehabilitation of the injured employee to the
extent that an earning capacity is again re-established, does not, by legislative
enactment deprive the injured employee of compensation benefits, but now
results in a decrease of weekly monetary benefits during the continuance
of the rehabilitated earning capacity.4' The duration of compensation
benefits for permanent total cases was changed from 700 weeks to life in
29. FA. STAT. § 440.25(4)(A) (C) (1959).
30. See Stuyvesant 'Corp. v. Waterhouse, 74 So.2d 554 (11a. 1954).
31. FLA. STAT. § 440.42 (1957).
32. FLA. STAT. § 440.42 (1959).
33. 107 So.2d 281 (Fla. App. 1958).
34. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(8) (1959).
35. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.39, 440.20(10) (1959).
36. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(5)(2)(B) (1955).
37. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(I)(C)(3) (1957).
38. FLA. STAT. § 440.49 (1957).
39. 102 So.2d 821 (Fla. App. 1958).
40, FLA, STAT, § 440.49 (1959).
41. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(l)(D) (1959). See Dennis v. Brown, 93 So.2d 584
(Fla. 1957). The Special Disability Fund had such provisions: FLA. STAT. § 440.15
(5) (D) (2) (1955) which underwent change, FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5) (D) (1) (1959).
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1955,42 and the weekly amount of compensation benefits was increased
from $35.00 to $42.00 effective July 1st, 1959, with extension of the
4 day waiting period to 7 days, subject to recoupment of the 7 days if
the disability exceeds a minimum of 21 days.
43
Complete uniformity has been achieved in legislative changes pertain-
ing to the statute of limitations. The time allowed for the filing of claims
for medical care has remained as two years from the date of the last
remedial treatment furnished by the employer or after the date of the last
payment of compensation.' 4 In 1955 the time limit was split, an allowance
of 3 years being given to file claims for compensation from the time of injury
or last payment of compensation.45 In 1957 the act was again amended
to allow 2 years to file claims from the time of injury, or from the last
payment of compensation or from the date the last remedial treatment was
furnished by the employer." In Robinson v. Johnson,47 the court held that
the reduction of the time limit from 3 to 2 years did not operate retro-
actively for claims having the benefit of the 3 year time limit.
The employer or carrier's interest in his injured employees' recovery
against a third party tort-feasor has undergone procedural changes allowing
the circuit court in the county where the cause of action arose to determine
the pro-rata share of each based upon equitable distribution of the amount
recovered when the cause of action is settled either before or after suit is
filed.' The right of the employer or carrier to bring suit, should the
employee fail to do so, has been limited to two years after which the
right of action again reverts to the employee. 49 Where the employer or
carrier brings suit, their right to retain from the recovery all amounts paid
and the present value of all future payments, remains unchanged. 50 How-
ever, where the employee brings the third party action, the 1959 act
allows equitable distribution to be had of the employers' or carriers' pro-rata
share for compensation benefits paid or to be paid,"1 rather than exclusively
on compensation benefits paid as the 1957 act provided.' 2
Various other legislative changes relating to removal of the complete
bar to recovery of compensation benefits, where the injury is caused by
42. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(1)(C) (1955).
43. FLA. STAT. § 440.12 (1959).
44. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(3)(B) (1953).
45. FLA. STAT. § 440.19(1 (A) (1955). Child labor penalty not compensation,
Ferlita v. Florida Art Stucco Corp., 74 So.2d 893 (Fla. 1954).
46. FLA. STAT. § 440.19(l)(A) (1957).
47. 110 So.2d 68 (Fla. App. 1959.
48. FLA. STAT. § 440.39(3) (19)( 1959)
49. FLA. STA9. § 440.39(4) (B) (1959).
50. FLA. STAT, § 440.39(4) (1951) renumbered § 440.39(4)(A) (1959). See
Bituminous Gas Corp. v. Hawes, 82 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1955).
51. FLA. SrAT. § 440.39(3) (A) (1959).
52. FLA. STAT. § 440.39(3) (1957).
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the willful refusal of the employee to use a safety appliance or observe
a safety rule, by substituting a compensation reduction of 25% therefor,
have been enacted. 3 Other minor changes have been made relating to
inspections by the commission, 4 commission expenditures,55 liberalization
of expert medical witness fees56 and allowances for excusing the late filing
of medical reportsY7
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The basic philosophy of workmen's compensation acts, i.e., to relieve
society of the burden of caring for injured workmen and to place responsi-
bility on the industry served, has frequently been reaffirmed by the courts.58
In this respect, the courts have held that the act should be liberally
construed and resolved in favor of the working manY0 Although the law
is designed to afford protection to workers and their dependents from the
hardships that arise from the workers' injury or death, 0 the act does not
make industry the general insurer of its employees.6 1
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act there must be a consensual
relationship to effectuate the status of employer-employee.6 The main test
adopted in determining the relationship is direction and control, the payment
of wages by itself not being conclusive.6 3 The major portions of the recent
decisions on employer-employee relationship deal with distinguishing the
relationship from that of an independent contractor. The question of
whether one is an independent contractor or employee is generally one
of fact,64 the determination of which is not based on any one factor. 5
53. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(3) (1959) as to construction of willful see Philbriek
Ambulance Sev. v. Buff, 73 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1954); White v. C. H. Lyne Foundry
and Machine Co., 74 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1954).
54. FLA. STAT. § 440.46(1)(B) (1957).
55. Fsa. STAT. § 440.49(1) (1955); FLA. STAT. § 440.50(l)(A)(B) (1955).
56. FLA. STAT. § 440.31 (1955). '
57. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1) (1957).
58. Paul Smith Constr. Co. v. Florida Indust. Comm'n, 93 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1957);
Dennis v. Brown, 93 So.2d 584 (Fla. 1957); Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Williams,
85 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1956); Florida Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm. v. Driggers,
65 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1953).
59. Great Am. indem. Co. v. Williams, 85 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1956); Baileys Auto
Serv. v. Mitchell, 85 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1956); Alexander v. Peoples Ice Co., 8 So.2d
846 (Fla. 1955); Townsley v. Miami Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 79 So.2d 785
(Fla. 1955); Parker v. Brinson Constr. Co., 78 So,2d 873 (Fla. 1955); Naranja Rock
Co. v. Dawal Farms, 74 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1954).
60. See cases cited note 58 supra.
61. Arkin Constr. Co. v. Simpkins, 99 So.2d 557 (Fla. 1957).
62. Maige v. Cannon, 98 So.2d 399 (Fla. 1957); Stuyvesant Corp. v. Waterhouse,
74 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1954). FLA. STAT. § 440.02 (2) (1959). See also Cohenour v.
Papet, 72 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1954), as to employees in the same business, and Parker v.
Hill, 72 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1954), on status of 'a deputy sheriff.
63. Wilson v. City of Haines City, 97 So.2d 208 (Fla. App. 1957); Gidney
Auto Sales v. Cutchins, 97 So.2d 145 (Fla. App. 1957).
64. Rainsford v. McArthur Dairies, 108 So.2d 914 (Fla. App. 1959).
65. Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Kendall, 88 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1956); Blackman &
Huekaby Enterprises v. Jones, 104 So.2d 667 (Fla. App. 1958).
1959]
160 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Lindsey v. Willis,00 a complex factual situation involving the relationship
between four possible employers, gave rise to an exhaustive opinion on
indicia recognized in determining independent contractual relationships.
Adhering to the competent substantial evidence rule 7 and by applying
the test of control, the court affirmed the deputy commissioner's finding
of an employer-employee relationship existing between the claimant and
his employer while reversing the deputy commissioner's conclusion of an
agency relationship existing between the other employers. 8
Simple solutions by application of any one test are, however, not
always available, particularly where the employee is a loaned employee.
In Stuyvesant Corp. v. Waterhouse,0 the first loaned employee case
decided in Florida in fifteen years, 70 the claimant, an empolyee of the
Casablanca Hotel on Miami Beach, sustained injuries while engaged in
a water show at the adjoining Lombardy Hotel. Each of the hotels put
on water shows and by arrangement between them, the employees of
both hotels jointly engaged in the respective water shows. The question
confronting the supreme court was one of employer-employee relationship
and who was claimant's employer at the time of the accident which
occurred during the show at the Lombardy Hotel. In finding there was
a consensual relationship, the court went on to hold the special employee,
Lombardy Hotel, as claimant's employer, placing emphasis on the fact
that the work being done at the time of the injury was essentially that
of the Lombardy which had the right to control the details of the work
and furnished the equipment.7 '
CEOGRAPHY OF INJURY
In the adoption of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Florida
Legislature provided for various specific weeks of compensation for per-
manent injuries.7 The number of weeks of compensation for which a
permanently injured workman is entitled is dependent on the geography
of the permanently injured portion of the body. 3a Unscheduled injuries
or injuries to what is commonly called "the body as a whole ' 74 have
66. 101 So.8d 422 (Fla. App. 1958).
67. United States Cas. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 55 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1951).
68. Indicia: direction and control, existence of contract for particular work at
fixed price, independent nature of alleged independent's business or distinct calling,
his assistants and right to supervise them, obligation to furnish tools, supplies and
materials, right to control progress of work except as to final result, time, payment, etc.
69. 74 Sa.2d 554 (Fla. 1954).
70. Berrier v. Associated Indem. Co.. 196 So. 188 (Fla. 1939).
71. Stuyvesant case distinguished Maige v. Cannon, 98 So.2d 399 (Fla. 1957),
on basis of equipment and employer being in business of supplying services. Also see
Narania Rock Co. v. Dawal Farms, Inc., 74 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1955).
72. FI.A. STAT. § 440.15.
73. Kashin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 98 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1957).
74. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(U).
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been subject to recent judicial interpretations which have had far reaching
effect. The landmark case of Ball v.. Mann75 applied the definition of
disability76 to unscheduled injuries pointing out that payments of permanent
disability benefits for injuries to the body as a whole is based on diminution
of earning capacity, thereby requiring deputy commissioners to take into
account, among other things, such variables as the injured employee's age,
industrial history, education, and inability to obtain the type of work
which lie can do insofar as affected by the injury. Post injury earnings,
though evidentiary, do not necessarily indicate the degree of loss of wage
earning capacity, if any, the court in Bell v. Southern Bell Telephone
and Telegraph Co.17 placing earning capacity on a broad plane, i.e.,
ability to compete on the open labor market. In the Bell case, the court
reinstated the order of the deputy commissioner who awarded compensation
on permanent partial disability for 20% loss of future earning capacity
even though the injured employee was receiving more money from his
employer for his post injury endeavors, the injury preventing him from
performing his preinjury occupation .7 8
The earning capacity tcst is also applicable to extended effects of
scheduled injuries.7 In Kashin v. Food Fair StoresY the injury was to the
hand only, but the geographical effect of the injury extended to other
parts of the body not within the schedule, thereby allowing a consideration
of the impact of the over-all disability on earning capacity. Similarly,
when the scheduled disability combines with other factors to render the
employee permanently and totally disabled, the limitation of the schedule
is no longer applicable.Sl No direct judicial opinion has been rendered
concerning the test to be used in determining partial loss of use of a
scheduled member adjudged to be permanent.82 The Florida Industrial
Commission has limited determination of" permanent disability resulting
in partial loss of use of scheduled members to functional or anatomical
75. 75 So.2d 758 (Fla. 1954).
76. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(9).
77. 108 So.2d 483 (Fla. App. 1959).
78. The disability award revolved around the employer failing to overcome the
presumption that the medical disability equaled the future loss of wage earning capacity
set forth in the Full Commission decision of Marsiglia v. Eastern Air Lines. Inc., Decision
No. 2-246, certiorari denied without opinion, 85 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1955). Whether the
denial of certiorari without opinion in compensation cases constitutes stare decisis,
see Collier v. City of Homestead, 81 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1955), and Maige v. Cannon,
98 So.2d 399 (Fla. App. 1957).
79. See cases cited notes 10, 11, 12 supra.
80. 98 So,2d 609 (Fla. 1957).
81. Noah v. Board of Pub. Instr. of Orange County, Florida, Decision No. 2-414,
cert. denied, 93 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1950).
82. See Ball v. Mann, 75 So2d 759 (Fla. 1954); and LARSON, THE LAw OF
WORKCMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 58.10 (1952).
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disability 3  However, in Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission
v. Driggers,4 the supreme court was confronted with an eye injury which
necessitated removal of the organ. Prior to the accident, the claimant had
only 10% vision in the eye, the insurance carrier taking the position that
the eye was industrially blind prior to injury and, there being no industrial
loss of use, the employee was not entitled to permanent disability benefits
for the loss of the organ. The court rejected several tests advanced for
determining "loss of use" including the industrial loss of use test and
adopted the "practical loss of use test." Later, in Andrews v. Strecker Body
Builders, Iw., 5 the court required the deputy commissioner to consider
all of the evidence presented as to the scheduled injury, including lay testi-
mony, but, of even greater significance, went on to state that where
appropriate, the deputy could reject the opinion of the medical expert
completely thereby placing the validity of the anatomical test in doubt.
THE In;ur
The disability brought on by the injury need not be the result of a
single trauma in order to constitute an injury by accident, the supreme
court stating in Czepial v. Krohne Roofing Company,"8 that the injurious
exposure occurring through the cumulative effect of constant inhalation
of dust and fumes aggravating a pre-existing disease, constituted an injury
by accident. Under the aggravation theory, the courts have stated that
the employer takes the employee as he finds him8 7 and that the aggravating
effect of the injury is compensable.18
Where there has been a physical accident or trauma and the
employee's disability has been increased or prolonged by traumatic neurosis
or hysterical paralysis, the full disability including the effect of the neurosis
is compensable. 5" In the landmark case of Lyng v. Rao 0 the court stated
that the trauma need not produce visible signs of injury. In neurosis cases
there must be an actual physical injury and causal connection with the
83. Richie v. Gains C onstr. Co., Decision No. 2-777, cert. denied without
opinion. 112 So.2d 925 (Fla. 1959); Bartolini v. Nasrailah Bros., Decision No. 2-778,
cert. denied without opinion, 113 So2d 282 (Fla. 1959); Parsons v. Coplan Pipe &
Supply Co., Decision No. 1-846, cert. denied without opinion, 113 So.2d 452
(Fla. 1959); Sanger v. Ansan Corp., Decision No. 2-816 (one Commissioner dissenting),
cert. denied, District Court of Appeals, Third Dist., Case No. 59-314.
84. 72 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1953).
85. 92 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1957); See The Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion "A Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment of the Extremities and Back,"
Feb. 15, 1958, for the medical profession's view of the doctor's function in permanent
iniuries.
86. 93 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1957).
87. Alexander v. Peoples Ice Co., 85 So.2d 846 (Fla. 1956).
88. Padrick Chevrolet Co. v. Crosby, 75 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1954); Alderman
v. Pail] Smith Constr. Co., I FCR 353 (Fla. 1956).
89. Moses v. R. H. Wright & Son, Inc., 90 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1956); Superior Mill
Work v. Gabel, 89 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1956).
90. 72 So.2d 53 (F1a. 19 4).
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injury must not be remote."' However, in Watson v. Melman, Inc.,9 2
it was held that the mental disability need not be based on physical
disability, a non-disabling physical injury from injury by accident causally
related to the resulting traumatic neurosis being sufficient,
Specific statutory beneficiaries are designated93 when death results from
injury by accident. The absence of such beneficiaries does not entitle the
deceased's estate to recover . 4 Dependency in fact upon the deceased must
be established in order to qualify for death bcnefits except by those
involving a conclusive presumption of dependency. 5 In cases where the
decedent was unusually ardent or impatient and had, during his lifetime, 0
accummulated two or more wives all of whom claim to be the legal widow
entitled to benefits, the courts have applied the presumption which exists
in favor of the last marriage. The burden of proof then shifts once the last
marriage is established to those attacking the last marriage, who, must
tender evidence which when weighed collectively establishes the absence
of a reasonable probability that the deceased actually secured a divorce
in the pre-existing marriage.97
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
Coverage under the act commences the moment the employee enters
the employer's premises even though the actual work has not yet begun
on the theory that at that moment the employee is engaged in doing
something that is necessarily incidental to such work.9 8 Coverage is also
extended to accidents occurring off the employer's premises where there
is a special hazard on the normal routc used by the employees as a means
of entry to and exit from the place of work.9 As stated, generally, in
Blount v. State Road Departnent,°0 coverage is not extended to injuries
occurring while going to and from work but, the rule has many exceptions
among which are when the journey itself is part of the services, 01 or, the
journey is made in the employer's conveyance, -02 or the journey is made
91. Superior Mill Work v. Cabel, 89 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1956). Also see City Ice
& Fuel Division v. Smith, 56 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1952).
92. 106 So.2d 433 (Fla. App. 1958).
93. FLA. STAT. § 440.16 (1957).
94. Amsler v. Sox Meat Packers, 75 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1954). Compensation benefits
terminate with death where death unrelated, Russell v. Bass, 107 So.2d 281
(Fla. App. 1958).
95. Paul Spellman, Inc. v. Spcllman, 103 So.2d 661 (Fla App. 1958); McCall
v. Warrington Home Builders, I FCR 299 (Fla. 1956).
96. Persico v. Samac Corp., 74 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1954).
97. Perkins v. Richards Constr.. Inc., Ill So.2d 494 (Fla. App. 1959).
98. City of St. Petersburg v. Cashman, 71 So.2d 733 (Fla. 1954).
99. Naranja Rock Co. v. Dawal Farms, 74 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1954).
100. 87 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1956).
101. N & L Auto Parts Co. v. Domon. Ill So.2d 270 (Fla. App. 1959).
102. Povia Bros. Farms v. Velez, 74 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1954); mere furnishing of
free transportation without specific relationship to employment not within exception,
Jacksonville Coach Co. v. Love, 101 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1958).
1959]
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by employees who have no fixed hours of cnployment.l 13 In the Blount
case emphasis was placed on the fact that the claimant was on twenty-
four hour call, was furnished a vehicle for this purpose and while
driving the vehicle home on the most direct route, suffered the accident
held to be compensable. The pivotal point of the furnishing of necessary
transportation was used to distinguish the case from Alan Wright
Funeral Homnes v. Simpson0 1 where the court held that the sole fact that
the employee was on twenty-four hour call has never afforded blanket
coverage to an employee without regard to the activity at the time of
injury.'0
5
Injuries occurring during purely personal missions do not conic under
the purview of the act. 0 6 However, if the trip or mission has a concurrent
cause related to the employment, coverage is extended, there being no
"nice inquiry" necessary to determine the relative importance of the
concurrent business and personal motive. 0 7
STATUTE OF LIMITATIoNs
The date of last payment of compensation in those instances where
compensation has been paid, constitutes the statutory time0 8 from when
the statute of limitations'0 0 begins to run. What constitutes payment of
compensation has been ably clarified by the Florida Supreme Court in the
landmark case of Townsley v. Miami Roofing and Sheet Metal Co."0
Under the principles of the Townsley case, the payment of regular wages to
a disabled employee during his absence from work because of the dis-
ability or because of obtaining medical care for the disability and the
payment of regular wages to a disabled employee who stays on the job
but who, with the knowledge of his employer, does light work because
of the disability, will be deemed to be payments of compensation. The
rationale underlying the Townsley principles is that so long as the pay-
ments continue, the employee has the right to assume the regular
payments of wages arc being made because of the employer's obligation
under the act and the employee is not bound therefore to make further
demand for compensation.'' In order for the regular wage payment to
be considered a payment of compensation, the employer must know or
have reason to know that the employee continued to suffer disability
103. Bowen v. Keen, 17 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1944).
104. 93 So.2d 375 (Fla. 1957).
105. See Hi-Acres, Inc. v. Pierce, 73 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1954).
106. Foxworth v. Florida lndustr. Comm'n, 86 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1955).
107. Cook v. Highway Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1955).
108. FLA. STAT. § 440.19 (1957).
109. Aboandandolo v. Vonella, 88 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1956); Bailey's Auto Service
v. Mitchell, 85 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1956); McLean v. Mundy, 81 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1955).
110. 79 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1955).
111. Anderson v. City of Miami, 101 So.2d 612 (Fla. App. 1958).
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as a result of tile original injury during tie period for which the coin-
pensation was claimed.
1 12
In Steinfeldt-Thrompson Company v. Trotter,' 3 an estoppel was raised
to deny the employer the defense of the running of the statute of limitation,
the employer having had knowledge of the injury, yet suffering the payment
of compensation benefits to be paid by another during the statutory
period for filing claims.
A'rrORNEY FEES
Unless approved by the Industrial Commission or rei'iewing court,
it is, by statute,114 unlawful for an attorney to receive any fee, consideration
or gratuity on account of legal services from an injured employee. The
same statute provides for the employee's attorney's fee to be assessed
against. the employer or carrier in four specific instances, one of which
applies to legal services on review.
In construing the assessment of the penalty provisions" 5 of the act
to be a recovery of compensation, the supreme court stated in Lockett v.
Smith6 that the attorney's fee provision of the act should not be nullified
by restrictive interpretation. In Great American Indemnity Co. v. Williams" 7
the same court indicated the hardship which would result if the attorney's
fee in that case were imposed upon the employee, thereby defeating tle
purpose of the act. Inadequate and excessive allowances of fees for the
employees' attorneys assessed against tie employer have been the subject
of review" 8 as have allowances of fees for purposes not encompassed by
the statute." 9
In Paul Smith Construction Co. v. Florida Industrial Commission'"
-°
the employer's first knowledge of the claim for further benefits was nine
days prior to the time payment was made. The twenty-one day allowance
to pay the claim from knowledge of the claim by the employer had not
been exceeded and therefore assessment of employee's attorney fee against
the employer was disallowed." The lengthy opinion of the District Court
of Appeals, First District, in A. B. Taff & Sons v. Clark:"-' decided on a
112. St. Joe Ice Co. v. Frazier, 103 So.2d 228 (Fla. App. 1958); University
of Miami v. Matthews, 97 So.2d III (Fla. 1957); Feriita v. Florida Art Stucco Corp.,
74 So.2d 893 (Fla. 1954); Daoud v. Matz, 73 So.2d 51 (Fla. 1954).
113. Steinfeldt-Thompson Co. v. Trotter, 95 So.2d 262 (Fla. 1957).
114. FLA. STAT. § 440,34(3) (1957).
115. FLA. STAT. § 440.20 (1957).
116. 72 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1954).
117. 85 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1956),
118. Chiles v. E. M. Scott Constr. Co., 91 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1956).
139. Insurance Co. of Texas v. Rainey & Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 86 So.2d 447
(Fla. 1956).
120. 93 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1957).
121. Accord Niatile Indus., Inc. v. Godbey, 109 So.2d 611 (Fla. App. 1959).
122. 110 So.2d 428 (Fla. App. 1959).
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stipulation of the parties, construcd the claim from which the employer has
21 days to pay after notice thereof to mean only a claim formally filed
with the Industrial Commission. The Court's reasoning was based on the
procedural provisions of the act providing a time limitation for the filing
of claims. The facts in the Taff case being based on a stipulation did not
indicate that the carrier had notice of any claim for compensation prior
to the claim formally being filed with the Industrial Commission. How-
ever, by the language used in the dictum, the court indicated that it would
be illogical and against the language of the statute to allow an employer
to escape liability for payment of a fee for the employees' attorneys if
the employer would simply refuse to recognize an injury as compensable,
thereby forcing the employee to retain an attorney and after claim is
filed, to make payment thereon.223 Good faith on the part of an employer
who declines to pay a claim on or before 21 days after notice thereof
will not excuse assessment of attorney's fees against the employer for the
employee's attorney,' 2' failure to pay being held to be equivalent to
declining to pay.
25
At the appellate level, attorney's fees are allowable provided there has
been an award of compensation benefits by the deputy commissioner 20
and the attorney has done sufficient work at the appellate level to justify
the assessment of the fee against the employer or carrier.
2T
PROCEDURE
The procedure in presenting claims before the deputy commissioner
remains unchanged. The deputy is the sole finder of fact12 1 and he must
make adequate findings of fact to support the directives in his order and
allow for intelligent review.'' 2 Mere recitals of evidence have been held
insufficient to fill this requirement." Under the act, the deputy com-
missioner has the responsibility of reconciling conflicts in the testimony and
123. Act said to be self execoting. A. B. Taff & Sons v. Clark, 110 So.2d 428
(Fla. App. 1959); Miami Beach First Nat. Bank v. Dunn, 85 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1956).
124, Great Am lnclnm. Co. v. Williams, 85 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1956)
125. Ibid. Also see Curry v, United Wine Stores, 1 FCR 184 (Fla. 1955).
126. Virginian, Inc. v. Ponder, 72 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1954); Sun Insurance Co. v.
Boyd, 105 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1958); Vick Roofing Co. v. Curtis, 110 So.2d 385
(Fla. 1959)
127. David M. Woolin & Son, Inc., v. McKain, 111 So.2d 475 (Fla. App. 1959);
Florida Juice Co. v. Yeates. III So.2d 433 (Fla. 1959); Chiles v. E.M. Scott
Constr. Co., 91 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1957).
128. Foxworth v. Florida Indust. Comni'n, 86 So.2d 147 (Fla. 1955); United
States Cas. Co. v, Maryland Cas, Co., 55 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1959).
129. Fischer v. John W. Thomson & Son, Inc., 92 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1957); Chiles
v. E. NI. Scott Constr. Co., 91 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1956); Cook v. Highway Cas. Co.,
82 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1955); Strachla v. Bendix-We-Laonder-Rite, 81 So.2d 657 (Fla.
1955); Hardy v. City of Tarpon Springs, 81 So.2d 503 (Fla. 1955).
130. Fischer v. John V. Thomson & Son, Inc., 92 So.2d 526 (Hla. 1957); Ball v.
Mann, 75 So.2d 758 (Fla. 1954).
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drawing inferences therefrom' and must consider all of the evidence, 1 2
his findings being subject to the competent substantial evidence rule.'
The injurcd employee has the burdcn of proving his claim without
aid of any presumption as to causal connection, 13 4 the presumption'35 being
available as to "course-of employment" only.3 6 In those instances where
the exact cause of the accident is unknown, the claimant has the burden
of proving a logical cause, which, once proved, shifts the burden of proof
to the employer or carrier to show a more logical cause.' 37
Procedurally, jurisdiction to determine an injured employee's right to
compensation benefits cannot be invoked by the employer or carrier.'38
Applications for review of deputy commissioner's orders must be filed
with the commission or deputy on the 20th day,' 39 from the mailing thereof.
Failure of uninsured employers, who have not qualified as self-insurers, to
file bond with the application does not vest jurisdiction. 40 The review
authority of the full commission is quasi judicial and exclusive, the circuit
court having no concurrent jurisdiction to review the deputy's order by
declaratory decree.'
4 1
Similarly, petitions for writ of certiorari must be filed in the supreme
court on the 60th day142 from the date the full commission's order is
entered.143 The sixty (60) day period is not tolled by the filing of petitions
for rehearing with the full commission, there being no provision for such
proceedings to date.' 4 4 In review of orders, the courts take judicial notice
of commission rules.
THIRD PARTIES
The exclusive remedy doctrine of workmen's compensation 145 has been
held to be an extreme one, not to be extendcd. 110 Derivative suits by
131. 11i-Acres, Inc. v. Pierce, 73 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1954); Hamilton v. Cumnmer Sons
Cypress Co., 70 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1954).
132. Andrews v. Strecker Body Builders, 92 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1957).
133. Woolin & Son, Inc. v. McKain. 110 So.2d 92 (Fla. 1959); Minute Maid
Corp. v. Florida Indust. Comm'n, 104 So.2d 104 (Fla. App. 1958); Frank Martin v.
Board of County Comm'n, Manatee County, 79 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1955).
134. Tampa Ship Repair v. Jordan, 107 So.2d 40 (Fla. App. 1958).
135. FLA. STAT. § 440.26.
136. Pridgen v. International Cushion Co., 88 So.2d 286 (Fla. 1956).
137. Nix v. Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock & Repair Go., 107 So.2d 616 (Fla. App.
1958); Lyng v. Rao, 72 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1954).
138. Great Am. Inden. Co. v. Williams, 85 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1956); Miami Beach
First Nat'l Bank v. Dunn, 85 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1956).
139. American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. All-Florida Stir. Co., 91 So.2d 633
(Fla. 1956); 11. W. Sperry, Inc. v. Matthews, 76 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1954).
140. Enterprise Marine Co. v. Vecc]hiarelli, 97 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1957).
141. Frix v. Beck, 104 So.2d 81 (Fla. App. 1958).
142. Crane Tile Co. v. Jenkins. 105 So.2d 795 (Fla. App. 1958); Columbia Cas.
Co. v. McFee, 81 So.2d 631 (Fla. 1955).
143. American Airmotive Corp. v. Stutz, 72 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1954).
144. Jacksonville Paper Co. v. Nolan, 80 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1955).
145. Fr..* STAT. § 440.11 (1957).
146. Goldstein v. Acme Concrete Corp., 103 So.2d 202 (Fla, 1958).
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those not covered by the act do, however, fall under the exclusive remedy; 14
while true third party recoveries do not deprive the beneficiaries under
the act from compcnsatioin benefits.
148
The Florida Supreme Court has held fellow employees to be third
parties,' 4 a corporation not under obligation to secure compensation to be
a third party not immune from suit for injuries sustained by an employee
of an employer who the corporation had contracted with for certain
construction;'50 and, the operator of a delivery service to be a third party
under a vendor-vendee relationship. 1'5 In contrast, the District Court of
Appeals, Third District, has held the owner of a rented crane whose
crane operator injured the general contractor's employee who happened
to be working on the same job, to be protected by the exclusive remedy
doctrine based upon the theory that the crane operator was a loaned
employee under the direction of the general contractor and was a fellow
servant tinder a "common employer."'
52
147. McCall v. Florida Power & Light Co., 87 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1956); Winn-
Lovett Tampa, Inc. v. Murphree, 73 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1954).
148. Cushman Baking Co. v. Hoberman, 74 So.2d 69 (Fla. 1954).
149. Frantz v. McBee Co., 77 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1955).
150. Jones v. Florida Power & Light Co., 72 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1954).
151. Goldstein v. Acme Concrete Corp., 103 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1958).
152. Smith v. Poston Equip. Rentals, 105 So.2d 578 (Fla. App. 1958) Loaned
emloyee doctrine not gone into nor status of crane owner to general contractor or
whether crane operator was a casual employee under FLA. STAT. § 440.02(2)(C)(3)
(1957).
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